If you’re super-elite, I suppose your job is simple: Don’t compromise on what it took to earn your reputation. It’s pretty straightforward: Don’t f it up, as a former boss of mine was fond of advising. (To be fair, he only used this with coworkers he trusted implicitly; he could be highly directive with others.)
If you’re like most every other firm in Law Land, however, you have a three or four-dimensional game to play. I can’t strategize in advance and in a vacuum for you, but here are a few of those considerations. First, don’t pretend the fray of price pressures is beneath you. You’d be bluffing and clients will think less of you if you seem out of touch with where your firm stands in the magisterial pecking order we all seem enchained by. (This magisterial pecking order is itself a topic for another day.) Have a spine and don’t apologize or be defensive when it comes to discussing your fees, but also be realistic. You know as well as your client that they have choices.
Second, talk with your clients frankly about their perception of the quality and responsiveness of your service and advice. If there are things you could improve, wouldn’t you rather know it while there’s still time to do something about it? And understand one simple reality: Clients don’t want you to fail, and they don’t even want to inflict pain. This is not an adversarial relationship. Clients want you to excel. Ask them how you can. This not only shifts the discussion and the focus away from price, it helps them appreciate how many valuable elements there are to your overall relationship.
Finally—this is the hardest, so I saved it for last—over time work on cultivating the perception that your service and advice are, actually, every bit as good as “fit for purpose” as the super-elite firm’s. You can’t and shouldn’t kid them that you’re offering them a Ferrari, but work on convincing them you’re offering a BMW. How often do you really need to go 200 mph in a street car? Or to have 12 temperamental Italian cylinders?
If we recur to retailing for a moment, two of the most successful global retailers of this decade—H&M and Zara—have cracked and are perfecting the almost inconceivably complex logistics challenge of bringing designer knockoffs to stores near you in a matter of a couple of weeks after the styles first hit the New York, Paris, and Milan fashion runways. Their business models are antipodal to Bergdorf’s, but they’re trying to satisfy the same craving for the latest style for a very different clientele.
So far, it seems to be working. Both H&M and Zara stocks are up over 20% over the last 12 months or so, compared with a slide of about 5% for Federated Department Stores, parent of Macy’s, Bloomingdales, Lord & Taylor, Marshall Field’s, and more. But back to Law Land.
The challenge, as always for those of us living near sea level and not in the high thin air of the super-elite, is balancing service, quality, responsiveness, and price. There’s no magic formula—if there were, we could repeal Chapter 11, after all; no one would need it.
All of us down here with the ocean views are, actually, trying to satisfy clients who, sometimes for some matters cross the threshold of Bergdorf, with the same overall “fit for purpose” multi-dimensional blend of personal and emotional reassurance, business-driven results, and value for money. Is this more challenging than being Bergdorf (or Ferrari)? Perhaps, but our playing field is capacious and our opportunities for applied imagination far more vast.
The “fit-for-purpose” formulation seems very well posed as a management paradigm. It lends itself very directly to a transparent basis for the value proposition to one’s client. It also allows a firm with a strategic view to determine with some rigor in what direction and how it might expand the range of purposes for which it is fit, and it provides a template for judging performance and progress internally.
In situations where there is a consensus group of super-elite players, there is a class of clients who will, at least for high-profile matters, select a super-elite firm as a matter of risk aversion. An example from another field: Consider the matter of Qantas Flight 32, an A-380 which had a catastrophic “uncontained engine failure” after take-off from Singapore en route to Sydney in Nov 2010. The engine that, to be short, exploded was a Rolls Royce Trent 900.
Huge business problem for Rolls Royce, of course, as they had to pay $950M to cover Qantas (and Singapore Airlines) changes on their A380s, plus loss of business. But no one at Qantas gets fired for selecting Rolls Royce in the first place.
What Qantas needed then was immediate access to other engine manufacturers who are “fit-for-purpose.” Purpose being (a) A380s and (b) right now.
Interesting article and hypothesis. Certainly seems an odd state of affairs to question one bill but not the other.
What I’m not quite understanding is where does this so called non-fee sensitive group lie? In your opinion, are we just talking about the V5 and the Magic Circle or is it wider/narrower than that?