The fiction of ownership
OK, before the comments-moderating engine goes into meltdown, let me hasten to add that when I say ownership in any meaningfully-sized law firm partnership is a “fiction” I do so in the ancient and honorable tradition of distinguishing facts from truth.
Of course it’s an almost tautological legal fact that every member of a partnership has an ownership interest (this is established by statute in most cases, common law otherwise). That’s partnership 101: So stipulated.
But the truth of what that ownership interest entitles partners to do, certainly in firms flunking the Two Pizza Rule, is very different.
I aver that since lawyers can be legalistic, they (wrongly) translate the legal fact into the operative/managerial fiction that they ought to have a co-equal hand in control of the enterprise. They ought not. Yet it would be unavailing at best, and a career-ending injury at worst, to explain that to most partners when they attempt to grab the steering wheel. This leads us to:
Implied license to run other people’s lives
As I noted, this is perennially the least attractive behavior the partnership form in theory permits and in practice sees abused. The presumed right of any given partner to issue orders to others who do not in any organizational sense whatsoever report to that individual is nakedly premised on the trump card, “I’m the partner.” (Whether or not the card is actually played is mostly a matter of social grace and discretion; everyone knows the card is held in the partner’s hand.)
Now, this may seem utterly logical to you, and I would be the first to admit that it’s about as common as the sun rising in the east. That’s the perspective of fact.
But from the perspective of truth, in a sophisticated enterprise it should receive zero organizational deference. It’s not any more mature—and it’s every bit as revealing of the vacuum of justification behind the demand—as the truculent, “I’m the mommy, that’s why.” This:
- Elevates the partner’s whim over organizational structure and priorities;
- Is nakedly insulting and, given sufficient repetition, terminally demoralizing to the business professional on the receiving end; and
- Again, exalts the trivial perspective of fact over the existential perspective of truth.
No, I don’t think “existential perspective” is putting it too strongly. The organizational and enterprise perspective is what matters, and always behaving in its long-run best interests is (I would argue) a obligation of membership in that enterprise bordering on the existential. Elevating one’s own immediate selfish impulse over that end is a betrayal of what partners above all should see as a bedrock obligation of their membership and participation in the enterprise.
[If you disagree with the enterprise’s behavior, values, or strategy, you are face to face with the classic choice of “Exit, Voice, or Loyalty;” but that’s not what we’re discussing here today.]The lawyer or the law firm?
This debate has been nothing if not long-running. And at this juncture we have little to add other than to reiterate our view, which seems breathtakingly obvous (although perhaps only to us) that, essentially, the answer is “Both” and “It depends.” (For confirmation see this column by a former AmLaw 25 partner, now GC of one of the world’s largest insurance companies.)
But what the answer to the question is doesn’t really matter for today’s purpose, recall. Today we’re tasked to design the ideal law firm of the future, and from the perspective of the firm as an institution, there’s no question the corporate form beats the partnership form hands-down. You may appreciate that BMW (say) has great engineers and designers, but you’re not likely to follow any one of them over to Audi for your next new car if they move. Your loyalty is to the firm, the product, and the brand. And that’s the way it should be.
Distorts financial reporting
No, I’m not going to go rehash the exhausted topic of the value of AmLaw-reported numbers. Not only have we all heard and some of us have participated in that debate ad nauseum, but I think the verdict is in and the issue is frankly settled. At this point any thoughtful observer can conclude that they’re not reliable, not comparable, invite gamesmanship, and purport to prominently measure things that don’t mean what they seem to mean. Which is not to say they aren’t an engrossing guilty pleasure.
Rather, the problem with partnership accounting is two-fold.
First, as universally practiced by law firms, but contrary to economic and management reality, profits of the enterprise are calculated before partners are paid. I don’t know how to say it much more directly (and we’ve written about this before): This is bizarre from a number of angles:
- Partners perform at least three roles, including laboring as hourly-billing lawyers, participating (some of them, anyway) in firm management, and then and only then being residual owners of the enterprise. Logically:
- They should be paid for their labor as an ongoing operating expense of the firm, analogous to what nonequity partners are paid for their labors;
- They should be paid for management also as an ongoing operating expense, analogous to what business professionals are paid for similar functions;
- and then and only then should they be entitled to the residual profit of the enterprise.
- Failing to recognize and distinguish among these three roles produces chronic and large over-statements of law firms’ profits compared to what those profits would be if accounted for on an economically rational basis.
Second, the requirement that partners are liable for income tax on their proportionate share of earnings whether or not actually distributed to them has served as an all but absolute bar to firms’ retaining income for future investment. Of course, all the tax laws say is that the tax is due on the partner’s entire share, not that it has to in fact be distributed. But I’d be shocked if you’d be invited back to any partners’ meeting where you bring up that distinction and suggest the firm actually has an important choice to make about paying out something < 100.00% of earnings.
I said at the outset that this piece would read as one of naked advocacy, and I hope at this point you would say I’ve been as good as my word. Now it’s your turn.
Time and again I’ve heard the virtues of partnership sung, whether it’s to serve as cultural glue, to bring out people’s most energetic and dedicated efforts, to encourage seamless collaboration, to inspire loyalty, or to provide a clutchless transmission between firm performance and individual recompense. And I’m sure there are other supposed linkages out there. All these goals are undoubtedly essential, and beyond that worthy and even aspirational for a sophisticated professional services firm.
So I invite you to make the case—in the comments here and/or at The Lawyer event in London in September—why the partnership form is indispensable, or optimal, for their achievement. Because I look at global consulting firms, investment banks, architectural and engineering firms, and more, all full of Type A individuals playing on some of the world’s great canvasses, and I see no shortfall in cultural glue, energy and dedication, collaboration, loyalty, or market-rate pay.
Or consider the corporations operating in the four-dimensional space of innovation, customer passion, employee engagement, and financial power, where (even if you might not do it exactly the same way) absolutely everybody is ravenous to know how they do it—Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Tesla. Not a partnership to be found.
Why must law be different?
This article was originally published in The Lawyer, and is reproduced here with kind permission.
I’ve sometimes posited that large law firms should change to being C corporations, for reasons that you touch on.
1. Corporations have centralized management.
2. The owners won’t have any phantom income on which to pay tax.
3. Related to #2, the corporation can retain earnings to fund expansion (albeit with a tax cost that the partnership structure avoids).
4. The owners will receive salaries, so compensation cost will show up properly on the balance sheet.
5. The reward for working can be separated from the reward for investing capital.
6. Compensation can be disconnected from percentage ownership.
7. If management is really, really bad, or simply uncommunicative, the shareholders can revolt and elect a new board.
8. A lawyer at an Ohio office of an incorporated firm with offices in 30 other states won’t have to file income tax returns in those 30 other states, not to mention in foreign countries.
9. The shareholders don’t have joint liability for the debts of the firm unless they explicitly guarantee them.
I can’t see any difference between what big firm partners do and what the salesmen in “Glengarry Glen Ross” do. Except that maybe the “coffee is for closers” speech they get when they miss revenue targets is more collegial in tone. Selling land. Selling law. Could be selling cars. If they bring in clients, lawyers should get commission from the corporation. Otherwise, straight salary. Corporate management then makes sure all the trains run on time. Including making the lawyers accurately bill their time and timely submit bills.
Three things:
1. Ask any outside investor (non-lawyer) if they would buy into a law firm as it is currently structured.
Under consideration:
– Part time senior management.
– Partners (co-owners in this situation) more concerned about their own practice and own continued employment than what is best for the firm.
– Lagging business innovation.
– Lack of professional diversity in senior roles, all lawyers.
– Partners who ignore simple business concepts (e.g. meeting collection targets for services) that usually get other executives/professionals fired.
I’d be pretty interested in the range of answers, which may start with “I can figure better ways to invest my money…”
2. Innovation questions which include:
– If you are a competitor/competiting outsider, what would you do to tear down your own firm?
– (Peter Drucker’s famous queries) If you knew now when you started the firm, would you still do it? If not, what will you do about it?
3. The old Chicago Bulls/Michael Jordan question: Do organizations or players win championships? Truth is you need both, but the best organizations will find ways to succeed or grow even after the best players are gone. (See: GE after Welch, Apple after Jobs, Celtics after Russell.)
1. A point not talked about nearly enough. Even some younger lawyers are starting to wake up to the fact that law firm partnership is not the financial brass ring it is purported to be. Added to your considerations:
– No hard assets
– No real brand goodwill outside of a small handful of top firms
– Illiquid market/difficult exit
– Poor economies of scale
– Flat organizational chart with loose reporting strings
– Personal proportionate financial liability for debts of entity
– Can be stripped from you almost arbitrarily with certain procedural niceties
Any financial investor would require an extremely high risk premium on that sort of investment. But lawyers kill themselves for the chance to make it.
2. If law firms really want to be innovators on an enterprise level, I would think about two things as a start (which, to be fair, we are starting to see). One, embrace establishing a skunkworks or incubator. Have to have a place where the people responsible for innovation are free (or at least shielded) from the normal expectations and operational rigors of the business. Innovation, without fail, requires investment of time and money. You want innovation? Put your money where your mouth is law firms. Two, law firms have to get serious about creating their own intellectual property. Could be technology, could business methods type of stuff. If law is an ideas business, we should be all over this.
3. BigLaw tends toward organizations winning championships. Lawyers with practices of any size have a team, and even then regularly need individual talent beyond what their usual team can provide. And all of the top performing law firms (by any metric you want to use) have extremely tight, cohesive partnerships all pulling in the same direction almost all the time. It is no coincidence that they have survived multiple generations of leadership and varied economic climates, and still grow upward.