What’s going on at Reed Smith?
Less than a week ago, they announced a roughly 20% cut in first-year associate salaries and hourly billing rates for the 50-odd lawyers joining the firm in January 2010. Here’s what they had to say about it (emphasis supplied):
“In response to our clients’ feedback and concerns about driving down the cost of legal services, we wanted to send a clear message that we are listening. So, we have therefore reduced both the rates and the salaries of our incoming first year associates” said Gregory B. Jordan, Reed Smith’s Global Managing Partner. “We have also launched a new competency based development program to better prepare our new lawyers to meet the needs of our clients.”
Annual starting salaries for the new associates beginning in January 2010 will range from $130,000 in major markets such as New York City, Chicago, California, and Washington, D.C. (down from a high of $160,000 in 2008), to $110,000 in Pittsburgh, PA. These actions solely involve the new associates entering the firm’s U.S. offices. Salary levels for 2010 newly qualifying lawyers in the firm’s European, Middle Eastern and Asian offices will be determined in the normal course of business during 2010.
“Our new U.S. starting salaries represent a reasonable and appropriate reset based on today’s economic environment,” said Eugene Tillman, the firm’s Global Head of Legal Personnel. “We believe this will put Reed Smith in a stronger business position in a changing marketplace while still providing fair compensation to our new associates.”
Billable hour expectations were also cut for 1st-years from 1,900 to 1,700/year (just over 10%), with the shaved time being devoted to training.
But the remarks I’ve highlighted go virtually all the way to explaining what’s going on, I believe: The firm wants to try to get out in front of client expectations (and demands) for economies in legal expense, and they’re targeting a hot button–the high salaries and low/nonexistent competency levels of junior associates. Will it work? Silly question: This is a buyer’s market for junior associate talent the likes of which most of us still alive and breathing have never seen. Young associates have zero bargaining power (OK, Rhodes Scholars/Supreme Court clerks/NFL wide receivers excepted, as always).
Will it become universal? Don’t hold your breath. As Jordan astutely notes elsewhere (at least I think it’s astute since I happen to agree with him emphatically),
In the wake of the downturn, Jordan said law firms in general are making decisions independently and apart of industry trends.
“Law firms aren’t copying each other,” he said. “Everybody is trying to figure out how to run their business and how to get it as rightly-positioned as they can. We’re seeing it every day. We’re going to see sharper decision making by all the law firms, not mimicking each other on every little thing.”
And now they have announced an even more radical move–well, at least one affecting about six times as many people, at a far more senior level–with the news that their 300 or so non-equity partners will be asked to contribute up to 15% of their compensation to the firm as capital. And if you would “prefer not to?” Then you can either forfeit your “partner” status, presumably achieving instant self-inflicted demotion to “associate,” or leg into the contribution over a few years. What you cannot do is stay a non-equity partner and decline to make the contribution.
Whereas the first announcement was greeted, so far as I can discern, largely with silence if not a collective yawn, the latter has generated predictable second-guessing and skepticism about the firm’s professed motives, most of it centered around what it does or does not imply about the firm’s financial fortunes. Jordan (disclosure: I consider him a friend and one of the more innovative managing partners in the business) was at pains to head off this speculation:
Jordan stressed that the move is not simply meant to provide a quick-fix cash injection or as a way of culling the firm’s non-equity partnership. “People could say, ‘Oh, Reed Smith must need the money,’ but the reality is we are having a very strong year,” he says. “And if you wanted to just trim non-equity partners, there are much easier ways to do that.”
Performing a very back of the envelope calculation, the move could bring Reed Smith $18-million or so (say somewhere between $15 and $20-million, to be safe), which is certainly a not-immaterial contribution to capital, and it’s manifestly easier to raise it from your non-equity cohort than going back to the well with your equity partners or your even less forgiving bankers.
Alas, the coverage so far raises more questions than it answers:
- What type of animal exactly is the “contribution?”
- A one-time payment, a sort of toll extracted for the privilege of continuing to carry the word “partner” on your business card?
- An interest-free loan, repayable (presumably) upon your departure from the firm (and what if the departure is “for cause” as far as the firm is concerned?)
- Is it secured or unsecured?
- Oh, and again, does it earn interest?
- Assuming it’s not characterized as an equity investment–and both the language of the stories and the premise of “non-equity” partner strongly imply it’s not–in what sense, then, are you a “partner?”
- The firm explains that part of the rationale is that some (but apparently not all) non-equity partners in European offices, primarily those in legacy merged offices, already have been required to contribute capital, so on that view it’s only a way to level the famous playing field between the US and the rest of the world. (there are two ways to achieve that, of course, this being only one of them).
- How does the 15% number compare with the capital contributions expected/required of equity partners?
- Are the other “terms” of the contribution identical or materially different?
- When a non-equity’s compensation goes up, or down, does their contribution rise or is a rebate expected?
One could go on, and I invite you to do so with your friends at home, but I have a larger issue to close with.
Assuming the Holy Grail of our world is the “one-firm firm,” the institutionalized firm in which everyone, from Managing Partner to non-equity partner to paralegal to administrative assistant, feels invested, a firm with a vision they can buy into, what here is not to like?
This has to be what Jordan is driving at when he says “[Non-equity partners will] have a stake in the business and meaningful profit participation, not just carrying the title [of partner]. [and] “It’s about not just saying you’re a partner, but actually being one. It means something. It revolves around risk-sharing in the business.”
We can take potshots from the sidelines to our heart’s content (here’s a sample), but who would seriously argue with the goals Jordan here articulates?
Or we may simply be overthinking this.
Econ101 teaches that if you want people to demand less of something, make it more expensive. Reed Smith has just made non-equity partner status more expensive.
Put that together with my belief that as an industry we let the entire non-equity tier grow out of control during the boom years, and you may be seeing the beginning of one approach to the problem. It’s certainly easier than having all those awkward one-on-one conversations with underperformers.
