How do you make decisions? By that I mean, when facing a material
strategic (a/k/a “big”) decision, who do you involve and what is the process you
use to decide? (Don’t pretend to blanche at the word “process”—lawyers
are all about process, as you darned well know.)
Courtesy of Michael Roberto (Professor, Harvard Business School)’s Why
Great Leaders Don’t Take Yes for an Answer (Wharton School Publishing:
2005) [at p. 32], I present this quite remarkably enlightening table
comparing the methodology behind JFK’s disastrous Bay of Pigs decision
with his universally-recognized-as-brilliant Cuba Missile Crisis decision. Evidently,
JFK learned something between 1961 and 1963: You could
too.
|
Process Characteristics
|
Bay of Pigs
|
Cuban Missile Crisis
|
|
Role of President Kennedy
|
Present at all critical meetings
|
Deliberately absent from initial meetings
|
|
Role of participants
|
Spokesman/advocates for particular departments
and agencies |
Skeptical generalists examining the “policy problem
as a whole” |
|
Group norms
|
Deference to experts; adherence to rules
of protocol |
Minimization of status/rank differences; freedom
from rules of protocol |
|
Participation and involvement
|
Extreme secrecy—very small group kept “in
the know.” Exclusion of lower-level aides and outsiders with fresh points of view. |
Direct communication between JFK and lower-level
officials with relevant knowledge and expertise. Periodic involvement of outside experts and fresh voices. |
|
Use of subgroups
|
One small subgroup, driving the process. “The
same men, in short, both planned the operation and judged its chances of success.” |
Two subgroups of equal size, power, and expertise. Repeated
exchange of position papers and vigorous critique and debate. |
|
Consideration of alternatives
|
Rapid convergence upon a single alternative. No
competing plans presented to JFK. |
Balanced consideration of two alternatives. Arguments
for both options presented to JFK. |
|
Institutionalization of dissent
|
No individual designated to occupy the special
role of devil’s advocate. |
Two confidants of the President playing the role
of “intellectual watchdog”—probing for the flaws in every argument. |
This is not to criticize or to laud JFK—as I will remind you for
the 179th time, this blog is apolitical. It is, rather, to contrast
two nearly diametrically opposed decision-making processes, one with
an outcome deeply embarrassing to the nation and costly in lives, the
other potentially saving our planet from nuclear ruin, and to gently
suggest you think about which model your actual decision-making process
resembles.
No people have been killed in preparing this post.
