OK, so this has nothing
to do with law firms per se; it’s still fascinating (and we’re allowed
to have recess even while school is in session).  The FT has
an analytic/speculative piece comparing the economic performance
in the post-WWII period of (a) the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia
[a/k/a the "English-speaking" world] with that of (b) Germany, France,
Italy, and Japan [non-English speaking, duh]. 

The story in a nutshell?  Starting in 1950 with average GDP
per capita at about 35% of the US level, the non-English speaking
group grew to about 80% of the US level by 1990, but has since fallen
back to 70%; and the UK/Canada/Australia combo has been comfortably
ensconced in a narrow band of 70-80% of the US level for the entire
time.  (The article’s charts are truly well done; be sure to
take a look, as they virtually tell the entire story without text.)  So
those are the facts.  The interesting question is, "What’s going
on here?"

Starting with the obvious, at the end of WWII Germany, Italy, Japan,
and even France were economic basket cases; they had nowhere to go
but up.  The late Mancur Olson contributed the best formulation
of an additional consideration:  As economies become more prosperous
(and as people become more complacent), "distributional coalitions"
seeking their own advantage arise and gain strength, calcifying the
economy.  WWII busted the Axis’ pre-war coalitions asunder,
and it took them 40 years to re-establish themselves. 

Meanwhile,
the converse was going on in the US, UK, Canada, and Australia.  When
the conspicuous pain of stagnant productivity, high inflation, a
crummy manufacturing sector and a crummier stock market all combined
to assault those economies in the 1970’s, everyone from policy-makers
to business executives decided to actually do something:  And
the result was an unprecedented wave of deregulation from the public
side and massive financial re-engineering (spinoffs, LBO’s, hostile
takeovers, recapitalizations, de-conglomaterizations, etc.) from
the private  side.  Over time, these trends had the predictable
beneficent impact.

It gets better.  (At least it gets better if you’re reading
this in the original English and not as translated into German, French,
Italian, or Japanese).   The late 20th-Century and (so
far) early 21st-Century acceleration of globalization has had a disparate
impact on the manufacturing sector vs. the service sector.  Manufacturing
is the quintessential activity capable of being relocated abroad. 

But
services are tougher.  (A haircut, a dinner, or even an opera
performance, might be cheaper in Mexico, but there are, shall we
say, other considerations.)   With relatively greater labor
market mobility in the English-speaking countries, and with relatively
less reliance on a robust manufacturing sector to begin with, service
sector growth and innovation has found fertile soil here. 

If you’re a lawyer, this is very good news (see, you knew I’d connect
it somehow).

As to whether it will continue, the FT ventures no opinion.  But
then, the global economy is not and never has been a zero-sum game.  The
happy circumstances we English speakers find ourselves in are not
remotely tied to the misfortune of sclerotic economies elsehwere.  We
might, however, be well advised to take a lesson and not drive into
that same snake-pit of indulging distributional coalitions.